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Abstract	  
	  
The	   commercial	   public	   service	   broadcasters	   (PSBs)	   in	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   (UK)	  
make	  a	  significant	  contribution	  to	  the	  country’s	  public	  service	  television	  system,	  
alongside	  the	  BBC.	  Operating	  under	  the	  UK	  communications	  regulator	  Ofcom,	  the	  
commercial	  PSB	  channels	  ITV,	  Channel	  4,	  and	  Channel	  5	  are	  required	  to	  broadcast	  
varying	   levels	  of	  public	  service	  content.	  This	  places	  these	  channels	   in	  a	  different	  
category	  to	  all	  other	  market	  broadcasters	   in	  the	  UK.	  By	  taking	  a	   critical	  political	  
economy	  of	   communication	  approach,	   this	  article	   examines	   how	   the	   regulatory	  
system	  functions	  to	  secure	  public	  service	  provision	  in	  television.	  A	  particular	  focus	  
is	   placed	   on	   the	   first-­‐run	   originations	   quotas,	   which	   govern	   the	   levels	   of	  
programming	  that	  are	  originally	  produced	  or	  commissioned	  by	  a	  commercial	  PSB,	  
and	   broadcast	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   the	   UK.	   It	   is	   argued	   that	   while	   fulfilling	   the	  
public	  service	  remit,	  the	  commercial	  PSBs	  gain	  significant	  benefits	  that	  contribute	  
to	  the	  underpinning	  of	  their	  business	  models.	  
	  
	   Keywords:	   public	   service	   television,	   Ofcom,	   media	   regulation,	   media	  
	   policy,	   political	   economy	   of	   communication,	   commercial	   public	   service	  
	   broadcasting	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Commercial Public Service Broadcasting in the United Kingdom: Public Service 
Television, Regulation, and the Market 
  
 
Introduction 
 
While the BBC is the United Kingdom’s (UK) main public service broadcaster (PSB), 
the UK’s commercial PSBs make an important contribution to the overall framework 
of the public service television system. In return, they receive considerable benefits 
which they gain from being part of the PSB framework, that contributes directly to 
underpinning their business models. A critical political economy of communication 
approach is taken in this article to the UK’s commercial PSBs, a group made up of the 
television channels ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5. Resulting from the analysis it is 
argued that the framework that the commercial PSBs operate within ought to be 
conceptualised in a way that highlights the distinction between it and that framework 
which their non-PSB counterparts operate within. In other words, the short-hand 
distinction (commonly used journalistically) between the BBC and the other ‘market-
based’ broadcasters which posits them respectively ‘public’/‘private’ is a clumsy one, 
and means that the importance of the current governance system and its maintenance 
can be missed. It is argued in this article that there is a dearth of attention given to the 
contribution made by the commercial PSBs to a plural and democratic media system; 
this is shown to be stark in contrast to the limited contribution made by the non-PSB 
organisations, a group which broadcasts all other UK television channels. 
    A focus is placed in this article on the quotas in relation to ‘first-run originations’ 
that the commercial PSBs are required to fulfil: that is programming which is 
originally produced or commissioned by a UK broadcaster, and shown for the first 
time within the country. This regulatory framework which delivers high spending on 
originations outside of sports programming is compared to that of the non-PSB 
television sector, where a very large proportion of money spent in this category is on 
sport. The first-run originations category is one key area where the PSB regulatory 
framework functions to ensure a form of broadcasting which meets the PSB 
requirements discussed below. The framework also helps demarcate a PSB system 
which remains normatively important within the wider broadcasting market. It is 
argued that the public service television system that is administered by the UK 
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communications regulator Ofcom may come under political pressure to be further 
liberalised.  
 
 
 
Applying Critical Political Economy of Communication to Public Service 
Broadcasting 
 
Critical political economy of communication is a well-developed field within media 
and communication research, strongly influenced by the British tradition, shaped by 
the work of Murdock and Golding (see Golding and Murdock 2000; Murdock and 
Golding 1997), and Garnham (1979, 2010), among others, If the approach is less 
popular within media and communication studies than the more dominant cultural 
studies approaches, it does have strong communities of scholars working in North 
America, (eg. McChesney 2013; Mosco 2009), Western Europe (eg. Hardy 2014) 
and, for example, Australasia (eg. Thompson 2011). Mosco (2009, 2) defines political 
economy as “the study of the social relations, particularly the power relations, that 
mutually constitute the production, distribution, and consumption of resources, 
including communication resources”. Here a focus is placed on flows of capital and 
labour, and on ownership and power in the media and communications industries. In 
addition, critical political economy of media and communication often encompasses a 
critical historical approach, as shown in the propensity of its proponents to illustrate 
the historical context of contemporary research subjects, and for the way in which the 
flexibility of the methods and disciplines it draws upon allows for this (eg. sociology). 
Moreover, the history of communication itself is one area subject to critical political 
economy accounts (see Mosco 2009, 109–113). 
   For Hardy, the critical political economy of communication approach “rests on a 
central claim: different ways of organizing and financing communications have 
implications for the range and nature of media content, and the ways in which this is 
consumed and used” (Hardy 2014, 7). According to Potschka (2012, 26), this form of 
analysis: 
 
 provides an appropriate framework to investigate the shift from state control to 
 market hegemony… it incorporates the relationship between transitions in the 
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 media and macroeconomics as well as socio-cultural paradigm changes and 
 recognizes the special nature of the media and its societal and democratic 
 function. 
 
Potschka’s argument here is directly applicable to the present study, as the 
commercial PSBs are required to contribute to broadcasting which conforms to such a 
special nature in the UK’s television system despite operating under market 
conditions. Here the critical political economy of communication approach provides a 
frame whereby the role of the commercial PSBs can be assessed and judged for its 
normative value. 
   A critical political economy approach to PSB can encompass both publicly funded 
and commercial public broadcasting, an approach exemplified in some of the research 
carried out in this area. Golding and Murdock (2000, 75) use the BBC as an example 
of an “institutional counter to the commodification of communicative activity”. Later 
Murdock notes that in relation to the BBC’s commercial activities, “By introducing 
calculations around the potential for commodification into institutional strategies … 
they compromise the moral economy of public goods” (Murdock 2010, 35). 
Addressing ITV, which is the main commercial PSB in the UK, Hardy (2012, 106) 
notes that the broadcaster has “lobbied, with success, for its PSB obligations to be 
reduced as it managed declining advertising revenues and audiences, and the 
diminishing value of its analogue spectrum”. (Later we return to ITV as a company 
which reaps significant benefits from its role as the main commercial PSB.) Finally, 
Born (2003, 792) found in her analysis of Channel 4 that the “assumption seems to be 
that C4’s commercial activities can have no detrimental effect on its PSB 
commitments; but even in purely economic terms such a view cannot be sustained”.  
 
 
The BBC as a methodological case-study 
 
While the BBC is not intended as the main focus of this article, we can use the 
Corporation  as an example for this form of political-economy analysis. As is the case 
throughout this article, qualitative document analysis (Atkinson and Coffey 2004; 
Forster 1994; Mason 2002) is used as a means of generating a range of data, such as 
information on legislation and regulation and on the finances of the broadcasters 
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considered here. A range of reports, documentation and resources accessed through 
institutional and company websites have been considered from institutions including: 
the BBC; the BBC Trust; Ofcom; ITV plc; Channel Four Television Corporation 
(C4C) and Channel 5. In each case where the article discusses contemporary 
conditions the most relevant and recent documents are used, which in some cases 
means drawing on data which might not have been updated for two/three years (1). 
   While the BBC’s income comes predominantly from the television licence fee, a 
form of public funding, its income is supplemented by activities within the private 
sector, both in the UK and globally. As the Corporation’s licence fee income 
continues to shrink – in the context of government imposed freezes to the licence fee 
and additional funding responsibilities placed upon the BBC – the impetus for the 
BBC to raise its revenues from these sources makes pertinent the importance of 
analysis and greater transparency on the BBC’s commercial activities (see Hewlett 
2015). Drawing our attention now to these activities, BBC Worldwide (the 
commercial arm of the BBC) had sales of over £1.002bn in 2014–15 earned 
nationally and globally in the marketplace (BBC 2015, 134). This entailed a large-
market based return to the licence fee-funded BBC television channels of £226.5 
million in 2014-15 (BBC 2015, 131). Such a return means that critical analysis of the 
BBC must take account of market activities that fall outside of the licence fee, where 
there has been a death of analysis up to this point (with some exceptions, eg. Donders 
and Van den Bulck, 2016). Indeed, as BBC Worldwide is now itself a significant 
commissioner of content – £94 million in 2014-15 (BBC 2015, 135) – the 
performance of it directly impinges on that content which is carried on the licence-fee 
funded channels. Rather than the BBC’s commercial activities being conceptualised 
and analysed separately to that research which focuses on the licence-fee funded 
Corporation, BBC Worldwide should instead be considered alongside the rest of the 
Corporation. 
   In addition to addressing the structural conditions of the BBC, it follows that 
attention to individual remuneration of directors at the Corporation should also come 
under scrutiny: for example, Tim Davie the CEO of BBC Worldwide & Director, 
Global, was due to receive a salary of £400,000 in 2015–16, not including a bonus 
option. This salary “is funded entirely by the BBC’s commercial operations and is not 
paid for or subsidised by the licence fee” (BBC 2015, 112), and the suggestion is that 
it should be uncontroversial to the critics of high-pay at the BBC (in the way that, say, 
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the salaries of the CEOs of ITV plc and C4C are). And yet, as a member of the 
Executive Board of the BBC (and as of July 2015 the Corporation’s second-highest 
paid employee after the Director-General Tony Hall who earns £450,000), Davie 
ought not to escape scrutiny. Rather his role, and his performance, are both directly 
affected by and in turn effect the licence-fee funded part of the BBC. 
 
 
The UK television market  
The UK television industry had a revenue of £13.2bn in 2014, 21 per cent of which 
originated from public funding (Ofcom 2015a, 145). By far the largest share of 
revenue is from subscription services, contributing £5.9bn, far ahead of the £3.8bn 
that came from advertising (Ofcom 2015a, 165). Of this, the share of advertising is 
mainly dominated by ITV/STV/UTV and ITV Breakfast which gained 35 per cent, 
and the multi-channel sector which gained 27 per cent (Channel 4: 12 per cent; 
Channel 5: 7 per cent; PSB portfolio channels: 17 per cent) (Derived from Ofcom 
2015a, 148). These significant revenue shares are driven largely by the high audience 
shares that the five main PSB channels command in the multi-channel era. In 2014, 
51.2 per cent of all viewing was to BBC One, BBC Two, ITV, Channel 4 and 
Channel 5. While this has been in overall and steep decline since the early 1990s, 
Ofcom has noted that it stabilised for the first time between 2013–2014 (Ofcom 
2015a, 192). Whether that is a harbinger of future stability remains to be seen. 
However, it is these five main PSB channels (of which three are commercial PSBs) 
that remain overwhelmingly popular with the audience. For example, when sport is 
excluded, Ofcom found that the twenty television programmes in the UK with the 
highest audiences in 2014 were all shown on either BBC One (thirteen) or ITV 
(seven) (Ofcom 2015a, 161). 
 
The Role of Ofcom 
 
As the UK’s communications regulator, Ofcom has a range of regulatory functions 
that mostly stem from the Communications Act 2003, which has been called “a 
sweeping programme of regulatory change … the most comprehensive legislation of 
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its kind in British history” (Doyle and Vick 2005, 76). Under the terms of the Act, 
Ofcom was charged with carrying periodical reviews of the PSB system, the most 
recent of which was published as Public Service Broadcasting in the Internet Age 
(Ofcom 2015b), and is charged with conducting on-going reviews of PSB in the UK 
(Ofcom 2015c). Ofcom has its own set of ‘PSB purposes and characteristics’ (Ofcom 
2015c, 4–5), with Ofcom summarising the purposes of PSB as being: “to deal with a 
wide range of subjects; to cater for the widest possible range of audiences – across 
different times of day and through different types of programme; and to maintain high 
standards of programme-making” (Ofcom 2015c, 4). One of the PSB characteristics is 
that content should be ‘Original’, with the principle being that the PSB channels in 
part broadcast “New UK content rather than repeats or acquisitions” (Ofcom 2015c, 
5), which directly pertains to the discussion below about the role of the first-run 
originations quotas. These quotas do not relate to the content of programming, but 
rather ensure that it is original, and thus all forms of programming may be 
encompassed within it. That said, the PSB purposes and characteristics do ensure that 
across the board the commercial PSBs are contributing to the delivery of a public 
television system that stands apart from the non-PSB sector.  
 
 
 
The UK’s commercial PSBs 
 
The UK’s commercial PSBs channels are ITV (previously known as ‘ITV1’), Channel 
4, Channel 5 and S4C, channels which along with the BBC’s television channels form 
the UK’s public service television system. The category of non-PSB channels is 
comprised of every other channel broadcast on UK television lying outside of this 
group (2). The funding models and ownership structures of the broadcasters who run 
these channels differ. ITV is a UK PLC and thus shareholder owned. Channel 5 is 
owned by the US global-national Viacom Inc, which was bought by the company from 
Northern & Shell in September 2014 for £450 million (Viacom 2014). Third, Channel 
4 is broadcast by C4C, a publicly owned, statutory corporation, which is mainly 
commercially funded through advertising. While C4C is alike to the BBC in the sense 
that it is publicly rather than privately owned, it does not receive any licence fee 
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income. Its main broadcast operation Channel 4 does, however, have a more stringent 
public service remit than ITV and Channel 5 (discussed below).  
   S4C, the Welsh-Language broadcaster, is mostly funded from the licence fee and 
direct grant, though some 2 per cent of its income comes through commercial sources 
including advertising (S4C 2015). Given this small proportion, S4C is not generally 
considered alongside the other commercial PSBs in the data that stems from Ofcom, 
and is accordingly not considered in this article on a full-footing with the other 
commercial PSBs. In the case of ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5, these are channels are 
part of larger media organisations, with additional television channels and online 
provision (3). These channels are augmented by time-shifted reruns on other channels. 
   In order to achieve the characteristics of public service television that it seeks, the 
Communications Act 2003 allows for separate public service remits for ITV (ie. the 
ITV licences and STV), Channel 4 and Channel 5. In the case of ITV and Channel 5, 
“The public service remit … is the provision of a range of high quality and diverse 
programming” (Communications Act 2003, 265.2). Channel 4, distinct from Channels 
3 and 5 in its ownership status as previously discussed, is set a more detailed and 
precise remit. Like 3 and 5 it must produce high quality and diverse programming, but 
in addition, it must produce programming which for example “demonstrates 
innovation, experiment and creativity in the form and content of programmes” 
(Communications Act 2003, 265.3). The Digital Economy Act 2010 later made 
additional provisions for Channel 4’s remit. Finally, while the PSBs are governed by 
the regulations discussed, among others, the non-PSB channels are not free from all 
regulation: for example, they are required to adhere to Ofcom’s Broadcasting Code 
(Ofcom 2013a) which governs areas such as harm and offence and applies to all 
television channels broadcast in the UK. 
  
 
 
The UK first-run originations quotas 
 
Ofcom has the power under the Communications Act 2003 to regulate the commercial 
PSBs on programming quotas for first-run originations, which are: “Programmes 
commissioned by or for a licensed public service channel with a view to their first 
showing on television in the United Kingdom in the reference year” (Ofcom 2015d, 
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413). These are distinct in the Ofcom terminology from first-run acquisitions, those 
programmes which are bought-in by a broadcaster and shown on UK television for 
the first time. These quotas are one way in which the programming of the commercial 
PSBs is demarcated from programming from the non-PSBs (see table 1), and which 
allow Ofcom to regulate for the PSB characteristic on ‘original’ programming 
discussed above (Ofcom 2015c, 5).  	  	  
Table 1.  Originally produced or commissioned quotas for ITV,   
  Channel 4 and Channel 5: 2004 and 2013 
 
Channel (Original) 2004 Quotas 2013 Quotas 
ITV (London 
ITV)* 
65% ‘originally produced or 
commissioned’; 85% during peak 
time hours 
65% ‘originally produced or 
commissioned’; 85% during peak 
time hours 
Channel 4 60% ‘originally produced or 
commissioned’; 70% during peak 
time hours 
56% ‘originally produced or 
commissioned’; 70% during peak 
time hours 
Channel 5 51% ‘originally produced or 
commissioned’; 42% during peak 
time hours 
50% ‘originally produced or 
commissioned’; 40% during peak 
time hours  
 
* London ITV is used here as an example, as each ITV region has an individual licence 
Sources: Ofcom 2004, 2013b.  
 
 
   From the Ofcom data considered in this study, there are two main points to be made 
(given the time-lag in the release of statistics, the data considered here was the most 
current when this research was being conducted). First, the BBC channels and the 
other main commercial PSBs spent £2.45bn on first-run UK originations in 2013 (see 
table 2); the non-PSB channels spent £1.96bn on first-run UK originations in the same 
year. However, spending by the PSBs in this category was only at 1998 levels, with 
spending reaching a peak in 2004 at £3.3bn (Ofcom 2015d, 2). By contrast, the non-
PSB channel’s spending has been steadily rising, from £1.38bn in 2008 to £1.96bn in 
2013 (Ofcom 2015d, 3). When sport is examined within the figures, the contrast 
between the PSB and non-PSB channels is stark. While sport dominates this figure for 
the non-PSBs, only 16.29 per cent of PSB spending in this category is on sports (see 
table 2).  
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Table 2.  Broadcaster spending on first-run UK originations (2013) 
 
Broadcaster Spending Percentage Spent on 
Sport 
Percentage 
Spent on other 
genres 
All PSBs £2.45bn 16.29% 83.71% 
Commercial PSBs 
(excluding BBC) 
£1.24bn ≈ 16.49% ≈ 83.51% 
Non-PSBs £1.96bn 82.14% 17.86% 
 
Source (data derived from or based on): Ofcom 2015d, 2–5.  
 
 
   The figure for the commercial PSBs (excluding the BBC) cannot be ascertained 
precisely, as it is not known exactly what percentage of the BBC’s spend goes on 
sport (due to, among other reasons, spending on sport being divided across multiple 
services). The projected figure for the money spent on sport by the commercial PSBs 
of 16.49 per cent has been calculated by taking into consideration that they spend 50.6 
per cent of the total spend on first run originations of £2.45bn (the BBC spending 49.4 
per cent) (Ofcom 2015c, 2). This is then reassigned to the percentage of the 
approximate the figure spent on sport by the all the PSBs (share of £399m) (Ofcom 
2015d, 5). While this calculation may be considered something of a crude tool, 
consideration of various factors tends to suggest that it could be a workable 
approximation. Contained in a report (BBC Trust/MTM London 2011, 7) is the rare 
publication of the figure of £261m that the BBC spent on sports rights in 2009–10 
(such figures are not normally released). Given that the BBC’s sports rights budget 
was cut by 15 per cent under the Delivering Quality First cuts of 2011 (BBC Trust 
2011, 9), this would mean that the BBC’s spend on sport has become more modest 
than it was previously (5).  
   Second, when comparing the non-PSBs to the commercial PSBs, the 17.86 per cent 
that the non-PSBs spend on first-run originations in programme genres other than 
sport is paltry in comparison to the projected 83.51 per cent spent by the commercial 
PSBs on other programme genres. Given that the non-PSBs are collectively 
comprised of hundreds of channels the some £350m that the non-PSBs spend is 
dwarfed by the ≈ £1.03bn for the commercial PSBs (83.51 per cent of £1.24bn, table 
2). That said, spending in this category is “up 43% in real terms from £245m in 2008” 
(Ofcom 2015d, 3). Spending on sport by the non-PSBs has been fuelled mainly by the 
(English) Premier League soccer rights acquisitions, with the traditional subscription 
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TV provider Sky facing massive competition from the comparatively new-entrant BT. 
The latest deal that involved BT and Sky paying £5.1bn runs for three seasons from 
2016-2019 (Ofcom 2015a, 183). When BT’s additional purchase of rights for the 
UEFA Champions League and Europa League are added in, this amounts to £2.01bn 
“a year on the rights to live coverage from these competitions alone” (Ofcom 2015a, 
183). 
 
 
Original programming and the public service imperative 
 
The first-run UK originations quotas ensure that the market makes a significant 
contribution to delivering the public service remit within the UK media system. 
Harnessing such the public service provision of the commercial PSBs contributes to a 
much greater plurality in public service provision than would be the case if only the 
BBC had a public service remit. As has been outlined, the commercial PSBs make up 
more than half of the spending on first-run originations by the PSBs overall. Without 
the commercial PSBs being held to these regulations the public service television 
system would be greatly diminished. But what, in essence is the ‘public service’ value 
of original programming, or in other words, should the PSB characteristic of 
originality (in the Ofcom sense) be considered something which serves the public 
interest?  
   Ensuring that the audience has access to original programming, intended for first 
broadcast in the UK, ensures that it stands apart from programming laden with 
imported content (often mainly sourced from the USA), or repeats of previously 
broadcast content. As has been evidenced here, there is a substantial difference in the 
extent to which the commercial PSBs deliver original programming as compared with 
the non-PSBs which are not required to meet quotas in this category. While the 
characteristic that the first-run originations quotas are designed to deliver on is not on 
its own enough to solely demarcate public service television from the rest of the 
market, it does make a substantial contribution to doing so. However, harnessing the 
market to make its contribution to the public service television system can also be 
mutually-beneficial to the commercial PSBs. We now turn to a consideration of these 
benefits and of how they contribute directly to underpinning the business models of 
the commercial PSBs. 
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Benefits from the Public Service Remit 
 
While we have discussed up to this point how Ofcom regulation requires the 
commercial PSBs to comply with particular quotas, the critical political economy 
approach to the commercial PSBs also allows for greater attention to be paid to the 
benefits that the public service remit can bring to these broadcasters. Here the main 
benefits are described as “predominantly access to spectrum (the valuable radiowaves 
that support wireless communication) to broadcast their services; prominence on 
electronic programme guides on television” (Ofcom 2015b, 1). Ofcom (2015b, 28) 
notes that “Appropriate prominence continues to be one of the few key sources of 
regulatory benefit to PSB providers. We believe that in an increasingly complicated 
and fragmented digital world, the importance of these principles grows”. However, 
this statement appears to play down the importance of EPG prominence – especially 
the phrase “one of the few” – a benefit which when the financial positions of the 
broadcasters are considered (see table 3) seems to be extremely important, especially 
in the case of ITV.  
    Prominence is both historically and contemporaneously what the business model of 
a broadcasting company such as ITV is built upon. For example, during its financial 
year in 2014, ITV plc reported revenue of £2.6bn, and adjusted profit before tax of 
£712m (a 559 per cent increase since 2009) (ITV 2014, 5). Its operating profit of 
£651m in 2014 was a 61.1 per cent rise on 2010. At the cornerstone of these earnings 
are the company’s broadcast and online operations which contributed over £2.02bn to 
revenue (ITV 2014, 6). As the main ITV channel is a major contributor to this, we can 
posit that the company’s sole channel with a public service remit is the anchor of its 
earnings. While this is somewhat speculative – the profitability of the individual 
channels is not reported – there is evidence reported by Ofcom which tends to back up 
this assertion. In 2014, the advertising share of the total television market gained by 
ITV/STV/UTV/ITV Breakfast was £1.37bn, which dwarfs the £0.65bn gained by the 
PSB portfolio channels collectively (Ofcom 2015a, 148). 
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Table 3.  Operating profits (ITV plc/Channel 5) / Operating surplus (C4C) 
  of UK commercial PSBs in millions 
 
Company 2011 2012 2013 2014 
ITV plc £404.0 £453.0  £546.0 £651.0 
Channel Four 
Television 
Corporation 
(C4C) 
£41.0 (£29.0) 
 
(£15.0) £4.0 
Channel 5 
(Northern & 
Shell) 
£26.2 (£16.6) 
 
£32.6 
 
 
N/A4 
 
Sources:  Channel 4 2014, 168; Farey-Jones 2012; ITV 2012, 96; ITV 2014, 107;  
  Northern & Shell 2013, 3. 
 
 
   Indeed, implicit in ITV’s business model is that the investment in the ITV ‘brand’ 
stems from the main ITV channel: this is described by the company as a form of 
progression, with one step leading to the next: “Building our ITV television and main 
channel brand; Extending that brand to our portfolio of channels and digital assets to 
reach all demographics; Growing our portfolio of programme brands and extending 
those brands beyond the television set” (ITV 2014, 8). Indeed, while only the main 
ITV channel has PSB regulatory responsibilities to fulfil, it is this channel that drives 
brand recognition in its portfolio of channels, gives it a prominent role as a provider 
of news, and which gives maximum exposure to major television shows (such as The 
X Factor), from which its spinoff shows can be broadcast on its other channels.     
   The three commercially-funded PSBs were mostly profit making in the years 2011–
2014 – or in the case of ITV plc, very profitable (table 3) – while delivering their 
first-run originations quotas. As we have seen, the impact of the first-run originations 
quotas ensure that these broadcasters generate large amount of original programming, 
which can be rerun or developed through spin-off programmes through the portfolio 
channels of these broadcasters. As UK audience demand is still largely for UK-
originated television, the quotas ensure that these commercial PSBs are replete with 
content – content which must compete on quality with the BBC, in the PSB system – 
which can then be sold to international markets, often attracting high returns (eg. as in 
the case of Downton Abbey).  
   Despite the mass-proliferation of television channels in the multi-channel era, none 
of these come close to matching the audience share of the three commercial PSBs. For 
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example, the entire Sky portfolio of channels only had an 8.2 per cent audience share 
in 2014, a decline from 10.6 per cent in 2004 (Ofcom 2015a, 202). Thus EPG 
prominence, alongside the demand for UK originated content, consolidates the place 
of the commercial PSBs in the multi-channel media system. If it can be described as 
“one of the few key sources of regulatory benefit to PSB providers” (Ofcom 2015b, 
28), it is at the very least an exceptionally important one.  
   Even if the importance of EPG prominence becomes eroded over time, through the 
growing importance of online streaming for example, the commercial PSBs have had 
their place historically secured at the centre of the media system. In terms of ‘brand 
recognition’, their place at the forefront of television before the multi-channel era on 
satellite and cable (and in the case of Channel 5 before mass proliferation of multi-
channel choice through DTT) has been secured. While these benefits can be relatively 
hard to quantify in some areas, the legacies of these businesses in terms of capital 
accumulation and profitability are central to their current positions (eg. Viacom’s 
purchase of Channel 5 led to a large windfall for Northern & Shell, stemming from a 
business built on PSB prominence). 
 
 
Future policy challenges for public service television  
 
The events leading up to the publication of the White Paper on the BBC (Department 
for Culture, Media and Sport 2016) – the government paper which sets out the basis 
of what the BBC’s next Royal Charter will include – rightly placed the BBC at the 
centre of public and political debate regarding public service television. However, the 
debate is too often divorced from a wider conversation on how the public service 
television system should be planned and implemented, and often discounts the vital 
role played by the commercial PSBs. While Ofcom suggests that the BBC is “the 
cornerstone of the PSB system and is the key driver of investment across the system” 
(Ofcom 2015a, 3), it is a system that depends greatly on ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 
5. The current PSB regulatory system ought not be taken for granted by scholars and 
policy analysts, especially given that a new Communications Bill may be introduced 
at some point in the close-term in the UK political cycle. With a majority 
Conservative government elected in May 2015, the next Communications Act could 
revise this current system.  
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   Under the previous Coalition government, Jeremy Hunt, then Secretary of State for 
Culture, Media and Sport, set out in September 2011 his priorities for what would 
have been a Communications Bill in that Parliament, a bill which still has not 
materialised by August 2016. Acknowledging that prominence in the EPG was still an 
important “lever”, Hunt stated: “we will need a lighter-touch model which, in 
particular, means that ministers and regulators will have to move away from 
micromanaging programme outcomes” (Hunt 2011). While it is unclear precisely 
what Hunt was referring to at this point, the originations quotas could easily be 
encompassed within this approach. If such thinking was applied by the current 
Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport and the wider government, quotas for 
first-run UK originations that apply to the commercial PSBs could come under 
pressure for liberalisation or removal. The critical political economy approach here 
draws an imperative for considering the politics of the media system in the UK. In 
this sense, a focus is required on and there is a need for analysis of the politics of 
media policy of the current Conservative government. It is one which has been shown 
to be one deeply entwined with the press interests (Freedman 2014, 1), and one 
strongly antipathetic to the BBC (especially seen during the tenure of the former 
Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, John Whittingdale). While 
speculation may offer little, we might confidently state that were the public service 
television system to be liberalised in a future Communications Act, it would not come 
as a great surprise. The first throes of this can be seen in the manner which the future 
of C4C has been handled by the government in recent years. 
   As well as the wider public service television system being up for debate and having 
the potential to be rearranged, it is also important to note the government had been 
considering various options for the future of C4C (and with it the broadcast entity 
Channel 4 itself), with the option that it might be fully privatised by the government. 
This would mean that its ownership as well as its funding model would be sourced 
from solely within the private sector, and its status as a statutory corporation would 
end. It was in the context of this the House of Lords (UK Parliament) Select 
Committee on Communications released a report on the matter. The committee 
recommended the continuation of the current ownership model, ruling out both full 
and part-privatisation, or the alternative option of mutualisation (House of Lords, 
Select Committee on Communications 2016, 7). That said, John Whittingdale, argued 
in evidence to the Committee for at least a part role for the private sector in C4C, 
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through commercial partnership or investment (House of Lords, Select Committee on 
Communications 2016, 17–18).  
  Later in May 2016 reports suggested that the privatisation of C4C had been ruled out 
by the government, under a Prime Minister who was two months later replaced by 
Theresa May (Sweney 2016). However, until the present government or its successor 
gives full and unconditional support for C4C to remain on its present statutory 
footing, it will remain as a potential target both for commercial investors and for the 
proponents of a UK broadcasting system which is nothing less than fully liberalised. 
It is possible that a privatised Channel 4 could fully retain its PSB remit, a point 
which Whittingdale considered in his evidence to be plausible, suggesting that for a 
buyer of C4C it would be “the last thing they would want to do was to undermine it 
by moving downmarket or changing the nature of the programming” (House of Lords, 
Select Committee on Communications 2016, 17). That said, there is no particular 
reason why that would be the case, with the possibility that the government would 
receive a much higher sale price if it were freed from its public service obligations. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It has been argued in this article that the current public service television system 
functions both for the benefit of the audience and for the commercial PSBs: the 
audience has access to significant levels of original material other than sports 
programming, while the broadcasters have in place the basis of their financial models. 
A cutting back of the system would be in essence ideological given the successful 
financial functioning of the system as it currently stands, underpinned by the audience 
demand for the five main PSB channels. Moves to dismantle or diminish this system 
may have the unintended consequences of diminishing the financial success of the 
commercial PSBs, while weakening the overall size of the television market (with 
probable declines in investment). Specifically on the first-run originations, a 
weakening of those regulations could diminish quality in the sector, lead to additional 
acquisitions and re-runs on the most watched channels, while inadvertently reducing 
advertising revenues. The point being, the regulated broadcasting system which 
includes both more-regulated PSBs and less-regulated non-PSBs can be economically 
as well as culturally valuable.  
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   The use of the critical political economy approach allows the testing of the benefits 
and drawbacks of market-based broadcasters delivering a PSB remit. Such analysis 
draws attention to the strength of the current system, allowing for a strong evidence-
based position from which to argue for a public service system based on mixed-
funding models, which provides the audience with programming which is distinct 
from what the market would provide if it were left solely to its own devices. 
However, the current system is one which could yet be subject to change under the 
current Conservative government, as ideologically-driven detractors continue to exert 
pressure on the very concept of public service television. 
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Notes 
 
(1) The main analysis for this article was written in July and August 2015. 
When the broadcasters’ spending on first-run UK originations is discussed 
below, the 2013 figures were the most recently available that were suitable 
for comparison. A previous version of this research was presented at the 
Capitalism, Culture and Media conference, University of Leeds, 7–8 
September 2015. The core findings were submitted to the public inquiry, A 
Future for Public Service Television: Content and Platforms in a Digital 
World, chaired by Lord Puttnam.  
 
(2) The non-PSB category include the portfolio channels of these 
organisations (eg. ITV2); those channels originating in the UK (eg. Sky 1, 
BT Sport 1); and finally those channels originating outside of the UK but 
rebroadcast there (eg. RT [Russia Today]). As of August 2016 there were 
more than 1000 television channels licenced for broadcast in the UK 
(Ofcom 2016). 
 
(3) For example, the ITV ‘portfolio’ (an Ofcom term) of channels on DTT is 
comprised of: ITV, ITV2, ITV Be, ITV 3, ITV 4, CITV. In Northern 
Ireland, the ITV licensee is UTV (formerly Ulster Television), which was 
bought in 2015 by ITV plc. STV in Scotland remains the only ITV 
franchise not to be owned by the company, which is rather owned by STV 
Group plc (which takes its name from ‘Scottish Television’). The Channel 
4 portfolio of channels is comprised of: Channel 4, More4, E4, 4Seven, 
4Music and Film4. The Channel 5 portfolio of channels is comprised of: 
Channel 5, 5 STAR and 5 USA. 
 
(4) Following the purchase of Channel 5 by Viacom, the individual profit 
breakdown for the company has not been made available. 
 
(5) This option was taken, informed by a Putting Quality First (BBC 2010) 
proposal to impose a spending cap of 9 per cent on sports rights across a 
four-year period for non-listed sports events. While spending on sports 
rights and first-run UK originations in sports are not one and the same, it 
can be estimated that a high percentage of the spend goes on buying the 
rights. A 15 percent cut applied to £261m would suggest a sports rights 
budget of some £221m. In this case, the BBC would be spending more 
than the 49.4 percent as used in this approximation. As a result, 16.49 per 
cent might even be too high a figure for the commercial PSBs, but within 
the context of this analysis, it can be used as a reliable approximation on 
which to base the argument. 
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